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It is well known that multinational oil and mining companies hold in-
terests and maintain operations in every part of the world. Natural oil and
mineral resources abound in the United States, South America, Southeast
Asia, the Middle East and Africa, among other locations, and many multi-
national companies have mineral mining and oil exploration and drilling
operations set up in all of these regions. Unfortunately for these companies,
while the flow of oil and mineral resources frequently remains stable over
long periods of time, some of the countries in which the oil drilling and
mining sites are located suffer from volatile political and cultural circum-
stances and frequently erupt in civil conflict.' These companies find them-
selves in situations in which they must find a way to protect their operations
* J.D. Candidate, May 2002, Northwestern University School of Law. I would
like to thank Gwendolyn Mikell and Herb Howe, professors at Georgetown University with
whom I worked closely during my undergraduate years, for their continuing support of my
African Studies research. I would also like to thank Steve Pfeiffer, a partner at the law firm
of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., for originally cultivating my interest in international busi-
ness law.
1 Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War. Private International Secu-
rity Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 75,
92-102 (1998). This section of Zarate's article describes three specific instances of conflict:
in Angola, Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea. All involved conflicts in natural resource-
rich regions of those countries.
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in these countries and their access to these interests during the civil con-
flicts or else they will lose their supply of extremely valuable resources.2
During the last two decades, many of these multinational oil and min-
ing companies have turned to outside specialists for assistance in protecting
their resources from destruction in these unstable countries.3 Along with
the weakened governments of the smaller countries in which they operate,
these companies hire specialists in the form of private security forces.4
These private security forces aid the governments and the oil and mining
companies in two main ways: (1) they attempt to quash civil uprisings,
thereby bringing "peace" to the country; and (2) they defend the regions in
which the oil and mining operations are located and protect them from de-
struction that could result from the uprisings.5 The services provided by the
private security forces therefore clearly support the oil and mining compa-
nies' interests in these countries.
This sort of arrangement between small governments, large oil and
mining companies and private security forces occurs frequently in Africa.
6
The African continent is rich in natural resources, yet lacks stability in
many of its national governments.' These governments, as well as oil and
mining companies with interests in those countries, have benefited from
contracts with private security, forces, whether merely through the forces'
military training of national troops or through the private security forces be-
coming directly involved in civil conflicts of those countries. 8 In some
cases, the private security forces have helped to restore a democratically-
elected government to power in the midst of civil rebellion. They have also
2 See CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, Working Outside of South Africa, available at
http://www.cdi.org/ArmsTradeDatabase/CONTROL/SmallArms/ Mercenar-
ies/EOWorkingOutside of SouthAfrica.htm (last visited January 27, 2001). This article
describes how SONANGOL, the Angolan Oil Parastatal, approached a private security com-
pany in the hopes that it would "provide a security team to protect the on-shore oil facilities
in the coastal town of Soyo, Angola [during a civil war in that country] whilst millions of
dollars of oil-drilling and related equipment was being recovered." See also Abdel-Fatau
Musah, A Country Under Siege: State Decay and Corporate Military Intervention in Sierra
Leone, in MERCENARIES 76, 99-100 (Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. 'Kayode Fayemi eds.,
2000). These sections describe how private security firms were hired to protect mines in Si-
erra Leone.
3 See generally, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, supra note 2; Musah, supra note 2.
4 See generally, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, supra note 2; Musah, supra note 2.
5 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 94-96. This section describes how a private security com-
pany both stabilized the country and liberated strategic mining areas as part of its interven-
tion in a civil war in Sierra Leone.
6
Id. at 89; ABDEL-FATAU MUSAH AND J. 'KAYODE FAYEMI, MERCENARIES 4-5 (Abdel-
Fatau Musah and J. 'Kayode Fayemi eds., 2000).
7 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 92-102; Musah and Fayemi, supra note 6, at 4-5.
8 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 92-102; Kevin A. O'Brien, Private Military Companies and
African Security 1990-98, in MERCENARIES 43, 50-51 (Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. 'Kayode
Fayemi, eds. 2000).
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secured resource-rich oil and mining operation areas and returned them to
the multinational companies. 9
While the oil and mining companies and small governments now seem
to depend on the support they receive from their contracts with the private
security forces, critics are beginning to question the legality of these ar-
rangements. In particular, some scholars are starting to address the possible
liability of the multinational oil and mining companies under United States
domestic law or general international law for human rights violations. 10
They specifically suggest that the companies may be liable in the United
States for the actions of these private security forces under the United States
Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA").1
This paper focuses specifically on the possible liability under the
ATCA of multinational oil and mining companies operating in Africa.
First, it will examine the relationships between the multinational oil and
mining companies, private security forces and African governments. In do-
ing so, it will describe the actual activities and operations of the private se-
curity forces in conjunction with the oil and mining corhpanies. Second,
this paper will outline the elements of liability under the ATCA. This will
include a discussion of recent cases in which foreign nationals have sued
multinational companies in the United States for alleged human rights
abuses committed abroad. Finally, this paper will explore whether the oil
and mining companies could be liable for the actions of the private security
forces in certain situations under the United States ATCA. It will also out-
line recommendations for the oil and mining companies on how to conduct
their relationships with the private security forces so that their likelihood of
liability might be reduced.
II. BACKGROUND: PRIVATE SECURITY FORCE ARRANGEMENTS
IN AFRICA
While multinational oil and mining companies do not readily acknowl-
edge their connections with private security forces in Africa, these ar-
rangements are well documented.12  In some cases, a multinational
9 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 92-102.
10 Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transna-
tional Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 359
(1999). Tzeutschler presents an in-depth review of the recent history of the United States
Alien Tort Claims Act and the ways in which large transnational corporations may become
liable thereunder for various human rights violations sustained in their foreign operations.
This comment relies heavily on the arguments Tzeuschler advances in his article.
" Id. at 418.
12 See Michael Grunberg, Letters to the Editor: A Sierra Leone Contract, INT'L HERALD
TRIBUNE, Aug. 28, 2001; Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. 'Kayode Fayemi, Africa in Search of
Security: Mercenaries and Conflicts - An Overview, in MERCENARIES 13, 24-25 (Abdel-
Fatau Musah and J. 'Kayode Fayemi eds., 2000).
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company essentially contracts with a private security force to provide pro-
tection of their oil and mining interests. 3 In other cases, the private secu-
rity forces are connected with the multinational oil and mining companies
through various corporate ties.14 In these situations, the companies effec-
tively hire one of their own divisions to protect their oil and mining inter-
ests in various African countries. This paper will highlight the involvement
of one major private security force through contracts and corporate ties to
multinational oil and mining companies in Africa: Executive Outcomes
(,,EO,,).15
Mr. Eeben Barlow founded EO in 1989 as a "limited liability company
registered in Great Britain and South Africa. ' 6 Barlow was an official in
South Africa's apartheid-era Civil Cooperation Bureau. 7 He has built up
the company so that now over 2,000 private soldiers receive their paychecks
from EO. 18 The majority of these soldiers hail from the former South Afri-
can Defense Force or South African Police. Whites dominate the officer
ranks of the company, however, the soldiers are approximately seventy per-
cent black.'9 EO's soldiers specialize in "clandestine warfare, combat air
patrols, advanced battle handling and sniper training. 2 °
A. EO's Contracts and Connections
EO has signed contracts with various multinational oil and mining
companies to provide security for their interests in African countries. 21 In
1992, for example, EO "signed contracts with oil companies Chevron and
Sonangol to protect their installations in Soyo, Angola. 22 In both of these
13 See CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, supra note 2; Musah, supra note 2.
14 See ABDEL-FATAU MUSAH AND J. 'KAYODE FAYEMI, MERCENARIES, xvi (Abdel-Fatau
Musah and J. 'Kayode Fayemi eds., 2000).
15 See CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, What Is EO?, available at
http://www.cdi.org/ArmsTradeDatabase/CONTROL/Small_Arms/Mercenaries/What-isEO
.txt (last visited February 26, 2001). Here, the Center for Defense Information has compiled
a dossier on Executive Outcomes, describing its history of involvement in Africa and its
training, military support and combat capabilities.
16 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 93.
P7 See id at 162 n. 115. Zarate explains that "the South African military intelligence
formed the Civil Cooperation Bureau as a covert assassination and espionage unit to elimi-
nate enemies of the apartheid state." See also O'Brien, supra note 8, at 49-5 1. This section
describes the early history of Executive Outcomes.
18 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 93.
19 See id.
20 Francois Misser and Anver Versi, Soldier of Fortune, 12/1/97 AFR. Bus. 814 (1997).
21 See generally, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, supra note 2.
22 Pierre Glachant, Mercenaries Changing Face of For-Profit Fighting, 11/15/97 AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE.
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situations, the oil companies hired EO to guard their operations during a re-
bel invasion near the oil sites in Angola.23
EO has also formed contracts with the governments of several African
nations, For example, in September 1994 the government of Angola com-
pleted a contract with EO for $40 million to provide training for the coun-
try's military and to help the Angolan army defeat the rebel movement.24
After its success in Angola, EO signed a contract with the government of
Sierra Leone to help fight off a rebel movement in that country.25 The gov-
ernment of Sierra Leone paid EO in the form of mining concessions in the
country's diamond-rich regions.26  EO was also successful in suppressing
the rebel uprising in Sierra Leone, although the country would later fall
again to rebel movements. 27 Despite claims that it will only work under the
approval of legitimate African governments, EO and its partner company,
Sandline International, have been rumored to have connections with certain
rebel groups.2 8
EO has benefited greatly from the handsome compensation packages it
receives for fulfilling its contracts with oil companies and African govern-
ments.2 9 The entities that reap the most from EO's services, however, are
the multinational oil and mining companies that are closely connected to
EO through corporate ties.30 These companies both hire EO to protect their
23 The Contracts, 12/1/97 AFR. Bus. 12.
24 Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of
Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 1, 18 (1999). See generally, O'Brien, supra
note 8, at 51-52; Alex Vines, Mercenaries, Human Rights and Legality, in MERCENARIES
169, 172-75 (Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. 'Kayode Fayemi eds., 2000).
25 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 95-96. See generally, Musah, supra note 2, at 88-89; Vines,
supra note 24, at 175-77; Steve Coil, The Other War, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 9, 2000.
26 See Zarate, supra note I, at 96-97. See also Musah and Fayemi, supra note 12, at 24;
Musah, supra note 2, at 91-92.
27 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 97. This article explains that Sandline International has
rumored ties with Kamjors militias in Sierra Leone. See also Greg Roberts, Australia Asked
to Treat Wounded PNG Mercenaries, February 28, 1997, available at
http://www.cdi.org/ArmsTradeDatabase/CONTROL/SmallArms/Mercenaries/Australia-as
ked to treat woundedPNGmercenaries.txt (last visited January 27, 2001). Roberts ex-
plains in his article that the London-based Sandline International is a subsidiary of Executive
Outcomes. See generally, Musah and Fayemi, supra note 14, at xvi.
28 See id. This article explains that Sandline International has rumored ties with Kamjors
militias in Sierra Leone. See also Greg Roberts, Australia Asked to Treat Wounded PNG
Mercenaries (February 28, 1997), available at
http://www.cdi.org/ArmsTradeDatabase/CONTROL/SmallArms Mercenar-
ies/Australia asked to treat woundedPNG mercenaries.txt. Roberts explains in his article
that the London-based-Sandline International is a subsidiary of Executive Outcomes. See
generally, Musah and Fayemi, supra note 14, at xvi.
29 See The Contracts, supra note 23; O'Brien, supra note 8, at 52; Musah, supra note 2, at
91.
30 See Musah, supra note 2, at 91-92.
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oil and mining interests in African countries and also benefit from EO's
government contracts through the assignment of mining concessions.31
Eeben Barlow, for example, has close ties with the owners and direc-
tors of the Canadian-based Ranger Oil company.32 During its operations in
Angola, Ranger Oil provided a guarantee of $30 million for EO's operation
to fight off the rebel movement that was endangering its interests in the
Soyo region.33 Because this also aided the Angolan government, the gov-
ernment then granted major oil concessions to EO, which transferred these
over to Ranger Oil, making Ranger Oil's number of facilities in Angola
much more numerous.34
Barlow also is closely connected with Anthony Buckingham, who
helped to incorporate EO in Great Britain.35 Buckingham is a major owner
of Heritage Oil, which also had interests in Angola at the time of the rebel
movement.36 Heritage Oil helped Ranger Oil to finance EO's operation in
Angola and also benefited from EO's oil concessions in the Soyo region.37
Barlow and Buckingham also hold. interests in the Canadian-based
DiamondWorks ("DMW").38 DMW holds mining interests in Canada and
is involved in several gold projects in China 9 Its most important mining
concerns, however, are located in Sierra Leone. 40 When "anti-government
forces overran the diamond fields" in the Kono district of Sierra Leone,
DMW may have helped to finance EO's operations to recapture the dis-
trict.4 1 DMW also benefited from the mining concessions granted to EO by
the government of Sierra Leone in return for the security and training the
EO provided to the government.42
B. EO's Security Activities
As previously mentioned, EO's main contracts with multinational oil
and mining companies and African governments have been primarily in
31 See Musah and Fayemi, supra note 12, at 23-24.
32 See O'Brien, supra note 8, at 51.
33 See id.
34 Louis Cauchy, South African Mercenaries Working for Canadian Interests,
L'AUT'JOURNAL (April 1997), available at http://bum.ucsd.edu/archives/ats-
I/I 997.Jun/0040.html.
31 See id.
36 See id. See also O'Brien, supra note 8, at 64-66.
37 See Cauchy, supra note 35; O'Brien, supra note 8, at 64-66.
38 See The Contracts, supra note 23.
39 See Roger Moody, The Mercenary Miner: Robert Friedland Goes to Asia, 18
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (1997).
40 See id.
41 See id.; Vines, supra note 24, at 180-81.
42 See Moody, supra note 40; Vines, supra note 24, at 180-81.
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Angola and Sierra Leone.43 As part of these contracts, EO carried out a
number of activities in each country.44 Throughout its activities, EO strives
to maintain an image of professionalism.45 It claims that it "merely trains
soldiers or engages in defensive pre-emptive strikes" but that it does not
engage in battle. It also claims to attempt to restrain its employees from
committing human rights abuses during their stay in a country.47 Some
sources, however, dispute these claims. They maintain that EO becomes di-
rectly involved in combat operations and sometimes kills or injures civil-
48ians.
In Angola, beginning in 1994, EO fulfilled its contracts by aiding the
Angolan army in defeating UNITA rebels who were waging a civil war
against the democratically elected government.49  In doing so, EO estab-
lished infrared capabilities, allowing the soldiers to fight at night, instituted
an advanced communication system, improved reconnaissance, introduced
fuel air bombs and increased air power capabilities, using helicopter gun-
ships and jet fighters.50 EO engaged in defensive strikes alongside Angolan
troops, which resulted in approximately twenty deaths of EO soldiers.5"
EO's involvement in Angola helped the Angolan troops recover critical
mining and oil territory, overcome the UNITA rebels and compelled the re-
bels to sign a peace agreement.
2
In 1995, the government of Sierra Leone had been fighting off a rebel
movement of the Revolutionary United Front ("RUF") since 1991 with lit-
tle success. 53 EO at first sent a small group of its employees to train the
government's soldiers 4 Soon after, it assumed control over all offensive
strikes "while using intelligence reports and sheer firepower to surprise and
overpower the RUF's insurgency. EO launched air assaults against RUF
bases with devastating effects ... Some journalists reported that EO's em-
ployees machine-gunned civilians from their helicopters as they pursued re-
bels. 55 As in Angola, EO's military activities helped the troops of Sierra
43 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 94-96; Vines, supra note 24, at 172-77.
44 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 94-96; Vines, supra note 24, at 172-77.
45 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 93.
46 See id at 94.
47 See id. at 96-98.
48 See id. at 94.
49 See id. See generally Vines, supra note 24, at 172-75.
SO See Zarate, supra note 1, at 94.
5' See id. at 94-95.
52 See id.
5 See id. at 95-96. See generally Vines, supra note 24, at 175-77.
54 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 96.
55 Id. See also Vines, supra note 24, at 173: "A former EO employee described his work
to Human Rights Watch in June 1995:
'We are professionals. We don't engage in unnecessary violence. We are specialists in
counter-insurgency operations. Most of our work was training, but we also engaged di-
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Leone to regain strategic mining areas like the Kono district, defeat the
RUF rebels and sign a peace agreement with the RUF. 6
It is clear from these examples that EO's activities in Africa exceed its
claims of merely providing training for government troops and restraining
its employees from committing human rights abuses. On the contrary, EO
undoubtedly has been directly involved in combat in many situations and
has been the subject of reports of alleged human rights violations.57 In
addition, through EO's contracts with multinational oil and mining
companies and African governments, and through its close corporate
connections with other multinational oil and mining companies, it is
obvious that these parties can be said to be at least partially responsible for
EO's activities in African countries. In particular, the multinational oil and
mining companies have unmistakably supported all activities undertaken by
EO to defend or reclaim major oil regions and mining areas.
III. THE UNITED STATES ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT ("ATCA")
The ATCA was originally enacted in 1789. It states simply that, "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 58 It was presumably motivated by a desire to insure that
claims by an alien against United States citizens or for incidents occurring
in the United States were litigated in federal court rather than in state couit,
so as to prevent the states from mishandling the cases and creating interna-
tional incidents. 59 More recently, however, United States courts have inter-
preted the scope of the ATCA as covering claims for international human
rights abuses occurring abroad.60 The United States Congress ratified this
broader interpretation when it passed the Torture Victim Prevention Act in
1991 ("TVPA"). 61 The TVPA provides that: "An individual who, under ac-
tual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation - (1) sub-
jects an individual to torture ...or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial
rectly in operations that had direct commercial consequence. Some civilians get hurt in
these operations but they were not our target. In the Cafunfo operations we did encounter
problems and things went out of control for a short time. That was unusual.'
56 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 96.
57 See Malik M. Chaka, Letter to the Editor of The Washington Times, March 10, 1997,
available at
http://www.cdi.org/ArmsTradeDatabase/CONTROL/SmallArmsMercenaries/I UNITAon
_EO.txt. Chaka states in his letter that "[t]here is a mountain of evidence from newspapers
on four continents that documents the extensive participation of Executive Outcomes merce-
naries in combat, both on the ground and in the air, and in human rights violations in An-
gola."
58 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
59 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 104-05.
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killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for
wrongful death.",62 The TVPA therefore recognizes that the law of nations
is incorporated into the law of the United States and that a violation of the
international law of human rights is consequently a violation of United
States law.
63
For years, United States courts applied the ATCA only to government
officials of the United States or foreign countries. Recently, however, the
courts have applied the ATCA to other parties, including United States and
foreign companies and private individuals.64 While very few cases under
the ATCA have been completely resolved using the court system, neverthe-
less, the courts have been treating cases against parties other than govern-
ment officials under the ATCA more favorably in their decisions regarding
preliminary procedural motions.65
A. Examples of Recent ATCA Cases Against Companies
For example, in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nigerian citizens
who emigrated to the United States sued two foreign holding companies
under the ATCA for alleged human rights violations.66 The plaintiffs in
Wiwa claimed that, on the urging of the two companies, the Nigerian gov-
ernment imprisoned, tortured and killed their next of kin in violation of the
law of nations.6' Apparently the two oil companies, Royal Dutch and Shell
Transport, were engaged in extensive oil exploration activities on land adja-
cent to the plaintiffs' homeland. The companies allegedly appropriated
land for these activities without adequate compensation, and caused sub-
stantial air and water pollution to the plaintiffs' homeland.68 The plaintiffs
began to organize in political opposition to the companies' activities in the
region. During the period of the political organization movements, the Ni-
gerian police and military attacked the local villages in which the people
were organizing, arresting the leaders of the movement on several occasions
and detaining them for long periods of time. The Nigerian police and mili-
tary severely beat and shot at several of the leaders, and eventually several
of the leaders were killed.69 According to the plaintiffs' complaint, even
though these activities were carried out by the Nigerian police and military,
Shell Transport instigated, planned and facilitated the attacks.70 Royal
62 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,28 U.S.C. § 1350 App. (2000).
63 See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 105.
64 See Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 362.
65 See id. at 62-363.




70 Id. at 92-93.
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Dutch and Shell Transport also allegedly provided money, weapons and lo-
gistical support to the Nigerian military, including the vehicles and ammu-
nition used in the raids on the villages. 1 The defendant companies were
able to get a jurisdiction-based dismissal of the case in the district court.
The Second Circuit, however, reversed the dismissal, holding that the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction over the companies, that jurisdiction did not vio-
late the due process clause, and that the forum was not inconvenient for the
defendants."
Jota v. Texaco Inc. provides another example of the United States
courts asserting jurisdiction over a company for alleged human rights
abuses committed abroad. In Jota, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs sued Texaco,
alleging that the company polluted rain forests and rivers near their homes
during oil exploration activities in Ecuador between 1964 and 1992."3 They
alleged that Texaco "improperly dumped large quantities of toxic by-
products of the drilling process into the local rivers, ... used other improper
means of eliminating toxic substances,...and that the Trans-Ecuadoran Pipe-
line, constructed by Texaco, has leaked large quantities of petroleum into
the environment. 7 4 The plaintiffs claimed that they and their families ex-
perienced various physical injuries such as poisoning and formation of pre-
cancerous growths, and sought damages under the ATCA.75 Again, as in
Wiwa, the district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. The
Second Circuit reversed, noting that the district court did have jurisdiction
over the company, especially in light of the fact that the company was un-
willing to submit to jurisdiction in Ecuador for these claims.76
The outcomes of these cases illustrate two ideas. First, it shows that
the United States is willing to accept claims under the ATCA against com-
panies rather than merely government officials. Second, since the courts
did not dismiss the cases based on any substantive issues, this demonstrates
that a strong enough claim against the companies exists for these and other
similar cases to go forward to a trial on the merits. These ideas will be dis-
cussed in more detail later in this paper.
71 id.
721 Id. at 92.
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B. Elements of the ATCA
1. Violation of the Law of Nations
As discussed earlier, the ATCA provides for a claim by an alien for a
tort that was "committed in violation of the law of nations." Although the
scope of the "law of nations" is not immediately obvious, the United States
Congress and courts have set down several clear definitions of the kind of
torts that are covered by the ATCA as part of the law of nations. For exam-
ple, Congress and the courts have stated that torture, extrajudicial killings,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, arbitrary detention, war crimes,
physical and cultural destruction of peoples, systematic violations of human
rights and environmental harms are to be covered under the ATCA as viola-
tions of the law of nations." This paper will focus mainly on the defini-
tions of torture, extrajudicial killings and war crimes because they are the
torts that are most closely related to the possible liability of the multina-
tional oil and mining companies through their involvement with the private
security forces in Africa.
Through the passage of the TVPA, Congress specified that acts of tor-
ture and extrajudicial killings should automatically be covered under the
ATCA.79 The TVPA defines torture as:
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody
or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than
pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to,
lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally in-
flicted on that individual for such purpose as obtaining from that
individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing
that individual for an act that individual or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or
coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind. °
The TVPA defines extrajudicial killing as:
[A] deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judi-
cial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing
77 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
78 See Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 410-18.
79 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 App. (2000).
80 id.
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that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the au-
thority of a foreign nation.8
In addition to the definitions of torture and extrajudicial killings found in
the TVPA, United States courts have also consistently found that torture
and extrajudicial killings violate the law of nations."
The United States courts have also consistently held that war crimes
are included under the ATCA as violations of the law of nations. Genocide
is one example of a universally-recognized war crime.8 3 The physical de-
struction of indigenous peoples or ethnic groups can be considered to be
genocide under the Genocide Convention. The Genocide Convention de-
fines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
84
2. Enforcing the Law of Nations Upon Companies Rather than State En-
tities and Officials
Along with the requirement that a claim under the ATCA be a viola-
tion of the law of nations, the ATCA inherently requires that the entity or
individual being sued must be bound by the law of nations. Traditionally,
the reach of international laws did not extend further than state entities or
officials.85 As illustrated earlier, however, courts have allowed corporations
with activities in foreign countries to be sued under the ATCA. They have
done this through primarily two different methods.
First, they acknowledge that certain norms of international law are
binding on all parties, from state officials to ordinary citizens, from state
entities to private companies, and from for-profit actors to non-profit or-
81 id.
82 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980); Forti I, 672 F.Supp.
1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
83 See Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 411.
84 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12,
1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (1951) [hereinafter "Genocide Convention"].
85 See Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 378-88.
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ganizations. 86 These norms are so universal under international law that
any party who violates them will become subject under any body that has
the right to enforce general international law. Norms that are considered to
be universal norms of international law include prohibitions against slavery,
slave-trading, piracy and genocide. 7
Second, the courts have found that some corporations have acted so
closely with a state or similar to how a state would act that the corporation
could be considered to have engaged in state action, and could therefore be
treated as a state under international law.88 Situations in which a corpora-
tion could be considered as engaging in state action include: "acting alone
but fulfilling state functions; acting in close concert with a state, for an iso-
lated event or over the course of a long project; participating in a conflict
that seeks to replace an existing or collapsed state; or acting as a state-like
authority over some territory."' 9 If a corporation engages in any of these
types of situations, and in doing so, commits human rights abuses, that cor-
poration is likely to be found liable if sued under the ATCA. Even if the
human rights abuses are committed merely by an employee or agent of the
corporation, the corporation may still be liable under the theory of respon-
deat superior.9°
C. Procedural and Jurisdictional Issues Common to Claims Under the
ATCA
Even if plaintiffs can show that a corporation was subject to the law of
nations under universal international law norms or through state action, and
then show that the corporation violated the universal law norms, the plain-
tiffs still may have to clear several procedural hurdles common in cases in-
volving claims under the ATCA. The most frequent procedural issues
raised by defendants in ATCA cases are forum non conveniens, exhaustion
of remedies, comity, standing, failure to join an indispensable party, and the
issue of being a foreign corporation not registered in the United States.9"
The courts in the United States allow dismissal under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens only when "an alternative forum is available, because
application of the doctrine 'presuposes at least two forums in which the
defendant is amenable to process."9 To decide the issue of forum non con-
veniens, a court must determine where the litigation will be the most con-
venient and will serve the goals of justice.93 When considering a motion to
86 See id. at 393.
17 See id.
88 See id. at 388-89.
89 Id. at 392-93.
90 See id. at 393-94.
9' See id. at 396-405.
92 Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 158-59 (2d Cir. 1998).
931d. at 159.
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dismiss based on a defendant's forum non conveniens claim, a court must
be sure that the litigation can be conducted in another place against all
named defendants.94
A claim related to the doctrine of forum non conveniens that defen-
dants sometimes utilize is the assertion that there has not been an exhaus-
tion of remedies in the place where the tort happened. This is particularly
true of cases brought under the TVPA in conjunction with the ATCA, since
it is a requirement under the TVPA. The TVPA provides: "A court shall
decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted
adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving
rise to the claim occurred."9 5 This requirement, however, does not strictly
require that a plaintiff file a claim in the place where the tort took place.
Knowing that this could be a burden on plaintiffs who live in a state with a
unreliable court system, the courts merely require the plaintiffs to show ei-
ther that the court system in their home country would not be an adequate
forum for the claim or that the courts in their home country are not "func-
tioning, workable or competent.,
96
Another procedural issue that defendants sometimes draw attention to
in ATCA cases is that of comity. International comity is "the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation., 97 Under the tenets of international comity,
United States courts customarily refuse "to review acts of foreign govern-
ments and defer to proceedings taking place in foreign countries, allowing
those acts and proceedings to. have extraterritorial effect in the United
States."98 When a court is considering dismissal of a case on the grounds of
international comity, it must look to see whether there is an acceptable fo-
rum in the objecting country and whether the defendant of the case in the
United States is subject to or has consented to jurisdiction in the foreign fo-
rum.9 9 It is worthy to note that United States courts will usually only allow
dismissal under the doctrine of comity where a foreign nation's interests are
so offended by the conduct of the litigation in the United States that dis-
missal is warranted without regard to the defendant's acquiescence to litiga-
tion in a foreign forum.'00
An additional procedural issue that defendants sometimes bring up in
ATCA cases is that of standing. In order to bring a claim under the ATCA
in the courts of the United States, a plaintiff must have standing. As a rule
in tort cases, the plaintiff must have been materially harmed by the viola-
94 id.
95 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 App. (2000).
96 Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 398-99.
97 Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159-60 (2d Cir. 1998).98 id.
99 Id. at 160.
100 Id.
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tion. 1° 1 If the victim is dead, then only the legal representative of the victim
may bring the suit. 02 This rule sometimes causes difficulties for foreign
plaintiffs, since the United States rule usually restricts the definition of legal
representative to immediate family of the deceased, and family structures in
some foreign countries are more expansive than those in the United
States.103 Groups are able to bring a claim for injuries to their group, but
only under certain circumstances. Such groups cannot file a suit on behalf
of their members unless "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to
sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.'
0 4
Yet another procedural concept that defendants sometimes use in cases
filed under the ATCA is that of failure to join an indispensable party. Rule
19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the district
courts are required to:
join a person who is subject to service of process and the jurisdic-
tion of the court if: (1) in the person's absence complete relief can-
not be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already par-
ties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed inter-
est.1
05
This requirement can sometimes become an obstacle to plaintiffs in
cases under the ATCA because if they are suing a corporation that worked
closely with a foreign state, and the plaintiff only sued the corporation and
not the foreign entity, the defendant corporation may claim that failure to
sue the foreign state was failure to join an indispensable party. Though this
does not always have an extreme effect on ATCA cases, it may sometimes
result in the dismissal of a case if the court determines that a foreign nation
is an indispensable party, and that the nation is not subject to jurisdiction
under a doctrine like the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act."'
10' See Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 399.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 400.
104 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
05 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
106 See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F.Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub
nom. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir 1998).
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One last procedural doctrine that defendants in ATCA cases may use is
to claim that they do not fall under jurisdiction in the United States since
they are foreign corporations. In this case, a plaintiff would have to show
that the foreign corporation had sufficient contacts with the state in which
the case was filed. 07 In ATCA cases against individual defendants, a plain-
tiff merely has to show that the defendant was in the forum state when
served with process. In cases against corporations, courts generally use the
rule that a corporation must have a presence in a state or must be conduct-
ing "continuous and systematic business" in a state for jurisdiction in that
state.'08 This can sometimes be very simple for the plaintiff, since many
states require a corporation to officially register with the Secretary of State
of a state to be able to conduct business there. Registering a business gen-
erally submits a corporation to general jurisdiction in that state.0 9
IV. ANALYSIS: COULD THE MULTINATIONAL OIL AND MINING
COMPANIES BE LIABLE UNDER THE ATCA?
The multinational oil and mining companies that contract with or are
closely connected to private security forces such as Executive Outcomes in
Africa may be liable under the United States ATCA for the activities of the
private security forces. This section of the paper will: (1) examine the ac-
tivities of the multinational oil and mining companies and the private secu-
rity companies under the elements of the ATCA; (2) work through possible
procedural issues relating to the companies' liability under the ATCA; and
(3) present simple recommendations for multinational oil and mining com-
panies working with private security forces in Africa that would like to pre-
vent liability for any of their activities under the ATCA.
A. Elements of the ATCA
1. Violation of the Law of Nations
As discussed above, one of the major elements of a claim filed under
the United States ATCA is that a tort was committed in violation of the law
of nations."0 Two of the torts that United States courts have recognized as
being in violation of the law of nations are extrajudicial killings and war
crimes, including genocide. In the circumstances described above involv-
ing multinational oil and mining companies and EO, there are activities that
could support claims of either extrajudicial killings or the war crime of
genocide.
107 See Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 404.
1o8 See id.; Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1990).
109 See Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 404.
110 See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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First, in the situation during the conflict in Sierra Leone during which
journalists reported that, while fulfilling contracts with the government of
Sierra Leone and several mining companies, EO's soldiers "machine-
gunned civilians from their helicopters as they pursued rebels,""'1 this is
clearly an example of extrajudicial killing as defined by the TVPA.12
In addition, through the participation of EO and the mining and oil
companies in the civil conflicts of Angola and Sierra Leone, EO may have
destroyed considerable percentages of certain ethnic groups in those coun-
tries, leading to a possible claim of genocide. It would be difficult for an
alien plaintiff to prove that EO and the mining and oil companies had the
requisite intent to destroy the ethnic group under the definition of genocide.
If the plaintiff could provide enough evidence on how the killings hap-
pened, however, it could be enough to show that the acts were committed
with the intent to destroy that group in part, which may be enough to show
a violation of the law of nations concerning genocide.
2. Enforcing the Law of Nations Upon Companies Rather than State Enti-
ties and Officials
As stated earlier, the second major element of a claim under the ATCA
is that a party who is accused of violating the law of nations must also be
bound by the law of nations. For a corporation to be bound by the law of
nations requires either that the international norm broken by the corporation
is so universal that it is binding on all parties or that the corporation acted
so closely with a state or similar to how a state would act that the corpora-
tion could be considered to have engaged in state action. EO and the multi-
national oil and mining companies could come under both of these
requirements. First, as illustrated above, if an alien plaintiff could prove
that EO and the multinational mining and oil companies committed geno-
cide, this would show that they violated a universal norm of international
law.
Second, EO and the multinational oil and mining companies with
which it contracted in Angola and Sierra Leone undoubtedly engaged in ac-
tivities that could constitute state action. They participated in many of the
situations described earlier as circumstances under which corporations
could be considered as engaging in state action. One of those situations
was when the company was acting in close concert with a state for an iso-
lated event or over the course of a long project." 3 As discussed earlier, EO
and the oil and mining companies worked very closely with the states of
Angola and Sierra Leone during civil insurgencies in those countries.
Through the concession of resources in those countries to the mining and
11 Zarate, supra note 1, at 96.
112 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 App. (2000).
113 See Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 392-93.
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oil companies, the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone received mili-
tary power and security provided by EO. These activities are a clear exam-
ple of EO and the oil and mining companies acting in concert with the
Angolan and Sierra Leonean governments both in the isolated events of
specific insurgencies and also over the course of the entire civil conflicts in
those countries.
Another situation in which corporations can be considered to be engag-
ing in state action is when a company participates in a conflict that seeks to
replace an existing or collapsed state. 14 In both of the situations of civil
conflict in Angola and Sierra Leone, the governments of the two countries
were so weakened as to be in a collapsed state. Their militaries could not
subdue the civil uprisings in those countries, and it was only the financing
of the mining and oil companies and the security provided by EO that
helped to rebuild the collapsed state. In addition, as mentioned earlier,
EO's partner company, Sandline International, which is affiliated with the
same multinational oil and mining companies, has accepted contracts to
train militias in Sierra Leone who were planning to overthrow certain lead-
ers in that country. Both of these situations show that EO and the multina-
tional oil and mining companies, in getting involved in the civil conflicts in
these countries, engaged in state action.
One other situation in which the activities of corporations can indicate
that they are involved in state action is when a corporation acts as a state-
like authority over some territory.1' 5 As discussed above, by enlisting EO
to provide security for the regions in which their oil and mining installa-
tions and operations were located in Angola and Sierra Leone, the oil and
mining companies were acting in a state-like manner, taking military and
police responsibilities into their own hands. In addition, usually the opera-
tion facilities of the oil and mining companies were the only entities located
in the remote regions of Angola and Sierra Leone. As a result, EO and the
oil and mining companies provided not only jobs for the workers at their fa-
cilities, but roads, sanitation, hospitals, schools, housing, and a host of other
basic services. 1 6 These basic services are equivalent to the types of ser-
vices that would normally be provided by a state for its citizens. In this
manner, therefore, EO and the oil and mining companies engaged in state
action through their activities and operations in Angola and Sierra Leone.
In these three ways, EO and the multinational oil and mining compa-
nies have engaged in state action. Since they have engaged in activities that
characterized them as state actors, they are consequently bound by the law
of nations and can be sued under the United States ATCA. The mining and
oil companies may claim that although they were closely affiliated with EO
114 See id.
I' See id.
116 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 99-100.
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and the states of Angola and Sierra Leone, they cannot be held liable for the
activities of EO that could be considered to be human rights violations like
extrajudicial killings or genocide because they did not actively participate in
EO's activities or did not know anything about the circumstances of the al-
leged human rights violations. An alien plaintiff, however, would easily be
able to argue against this claim by utilizing the theory of respondeat supe-
rior to show that EO acted as an employee or agent of the oil and mining
companies, and they should therefore be held responsible for the actions of
EO.
B. Procedural Issues and Recommendations for the Oil and Mining
Companies
Despite the fact that an alien plaintiff could have strong arguments that
EO and the multinational oil and mining companies committed violations
under the ATCA, the companies could raise several of the procedural
claims discussed above which might be causes for dismissal from a United
States court. Since the outcomes of these procedural claims are difficult to
determine in the absence of the specific details of an actual case, this paper
will not analyze them. It is sufficient to note, however, that, depending on
the specific circumstances of the case and the alien plaintiffs who may bring
it, these procedural claims are not insurmountable for alien plaintiffs, as
evidenced by the favorable outcomes in procedural hearings in similar cases
under the ATCA."' EO and the multinational oil and mining companies
should therefore remain aware of their possible liability under the ATCA.
It is possible, however, for the multinational oil and mining companies
to proactively shield themselves from possible liability from claims in the
United States under the ATCA. Of course, the most obvious way of pro-
tecting themselves from liability under the ATCA would be for EO and the
multinational oil and mining companies to take steps to ensure that no hu-
man rights abuses occur as a result of their security activities in Africa.
These steps could include a plan where EO would strictly restrict itself only
to training activities with the militaries of African countries. They could
also involve a situation in which the multinational oil and mining compa-
nies monitor EO's activities to ensure that no human rights abuses occur.
The companies might also attempt to restrict their activities so it does not
appear that they are working so closely in concert with the governments of
African countries. This would make it more difficult for an alien plaintiff
to fulfill the state action element of the ATCA.
Short of these steps, however, EO and the multinational oil and mining
companies can also attempt to shield themselves from possible liability in
the United States by remaining outside the jurisdiction of the United States
117 See Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
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courts. This can be done by limiting their contacts with the United States.
While this might be difficult or impossible for companies that are headquar-
tered or have large business units in the United States, such as Chevron, it
may be a bit easier for companies based outside of the United States, in
countries such as South Africa, Canada or Great Britain, such as Heritage
Oil and DiamondWorks. However, even a small amount of business is
enough to prompt jurisdiction in the United States. As long as a company
has a resence in a state or conducts "continuous and systematic busi-
ness"1 in a state, it will be enough for a United States federal court in that
state to have jurisdiction over the company for the purposes of an alien
plaintiff's claim under the ATCA. These companies must keep this in mind
when planning their business structures with respect to escaping United
States jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
The interests that multinational oil and mining companies hold in Af-
rica constitute the essence of their business. It is therefore of paramount
concern to these companies to be able to protect their interests, especially in
the context of destructive and violent civil uprisings in the countries in
which these interests are located. It may therefore seem as though it is the
perfect solution for these companies to work in concert with private security
forces such as Executive Outcomes and with the governments of the Afri-
can countries to protect those interests in any way possible. These ar-
rangements, however, can easily lead to claims under the United States
ATCA for possible human rights violations. Based on the current trend of
United States courts, which are becoming seemingly more open to ATCA
claims against domestic and foreign corporations for torts committed over-
seas, liability for these companies under the ATCA is a very real concern.
Consequently, these companies should take steps to ensure that these ar-
rangements will not compromise their standing under international law and
prepare themselves accordingly for possible claims in the future under the
ATCA.
118 See Tzeutschler, supra note 10, at 404; Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1990).
